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COMMENTS
EVIDENCE - BLOOD GROUPING IN BASTARDY - JURY'S SOLE
FUNCTION MAY BE IN DETERMINING USE OF PROPER LABORATORY
METHODS.-Complainant brought bastardy action and had a ver-
dict designating respondent father of her twins. This was the
finding of the jury despite the admission into evidence of statu-
torily authorized blood grouping tests which conclusively demon-
strated respondent's non-paternity. On appeal it was held that
where, as here, there is no challenge of the skill and accuracy
utilized in performing such tests, a showing of incompatible
blood groups must exclude respondent's filiation as a matter of
law. Motion for a new trial was granted, the appellate court
specifying that the jury was to limit its inquiry to the ascertain-
ment of the presence of purely technical conditions needed to
make the biological law operative.,
It is no novelty for Maine juries to be forbidden a determina-
tion of the evidentiary weight to be assigned the gentic laws of
blood inheritance. 2 This does not indicate any special daring or
scientific consciousness on the part of the local courts until com-
pared with the considerable "cultural lag" found in other juris-
dictions.' Although the cry emanating from the medical profes-
sion and medico-legal writers has been loud and sustained,, it is
only in recent years that any great judicial significance has been
placed on the evidence from blood groupings.5 This evidence
could have had and will have greater influence on varied actions
both criminal and civil. Jordan v. Mace5 has been anticipated in
the New York lower courts where at least twice, in actions by
husband against wife, the unchallenged testimony of leading
serologists was given conclusive effect.7 These cases are excep-
tions. Elsewhere the most recognition afforded such evidence
1. Jordan v. Mace, 69 A.2d. 670 (Me. 1949).
2. See Jordan v. Davis, 57 A.2d 209, 210 (Me. 1948).
3. Britt, Blood-Grouping Tests and the Law: The Problem of "Cultural
Lag," 21 MINN. L. REv. 671, 679-691 (1937).
4. Britt, supra note 3- 25 IOWA L. REy. 823 (1940); Schatkin, Paternity
Blood-Grouping Tests: Recent Setbacks, 32 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 458
(1941); Note, 16 TENN. L. REv. 734 (1941); Note, 34 CORNELL L. Q. 72
(1948). There has been a superabundance of material published in this
field.
5. Maguire, A Survey of Blood Group Decisions and Legislation in the
American Law of Evidence, 16 So. CALIF. L. RFv. 161 (1943); Schoch,
Determination of Paternity by Blood-Grouping Tests: The European Expe-
rience, id. at 177. For a collection of cases, see Note, 163 A.L.R. 939 (1946).
6. 69 A.2d 670 (Me. 1949).
7. Saks v. Saks, 189 Misc. 667, 71 N.Y.S.2d. 797 (N.Y. Dom n.Rel. Ct.
1947); Schulze v. Schulze, 35 N.Y.S.2d 218, 220 (Sup. Ct. 1942), "To deny
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in bastardy proceedings has been to admit it for whatever worth
the jury decide." Probably owing to attendant sordid and
degrading fact situations comparatively few filiation suits are
appealed, the litigants having a natural desire to end the matter
as quickly as possible.9 This hardly encourages the acceptance
of evidentiary innovation. Nor is bastardy a favored action, as
witness the old Mansfield approach. o The peculiar problems of
stare decisis, a sensible judicial distrust for medical theory that
is definitively unconstant, and, perhaps, a fear of the social
implications of easy bastardization hardly cushion this collision
of science and law. Further, many courts were and are without
legislative pronouncement by way of enabling statutes for man-
datory blood test procedure. 1 The state of Maine then, despite
a dearth of precedent, has consistently used an unsophisticated
approach to the problem of serology in law.
There is no scientific doubt that the presence of certain sero-
logic conditions will conclusively demonstrate one individual
filially unrelated to another. It does not follow that certain
other conditions will prove relationship because the identical
blood structure of the actual progenitor may be found in a great
number of persons. However, the innocent man has better than
a fifty percent chance of exoneration through one of the three
accepted classification tests.12 The "A and B" test was developed
plaintiff a decree in this action would be tantamount to a holding by this
court that... Dr. Caspar [testifying serologist] was not worthy of belief
[and] the procedure for a blood test, authorized by . the Civil Practice
Act, is futile insofar as having any probative value."
8. State ex rel. Walker v. Clark, 144 Ohio 305, 58 N.E.2nd 773 (1944);
Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App.2d 652, 169, P. 2d 442 (1946); Ehrlich v.
Ehrlich 181 Misc 1057, 49 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
9. S(otkin, Law and Science in Collision: Use of Blood Tests in Pater-
nity Suits, 32 VA. L. REV. 886 (1946). Apparentiy contested legitimacy is
encountered to a surprising extent in domestic relations courts. The pre-
sumption of legitinmacy of the issue of a married woman must be under-
stood as just that: a "presumption" and rebuttable.
10. See extensive discussion of ancient disapprobations in note, 25 MARQ.
L. Ruy. 148 (1941).
11. Eight states have blood grouping statutes of one type or another-
none with conclusive terms. ME. REv. STAT. c. 153, §34 (1944), MD. ANN.
CODE GEN. LAws art. 12, §17 (Flack, Supp. 143); N. J. STAT. ANN. §2: 99-
3, 4 (Supp. 1946); N. Y. Civ. PIAc. ACT, §306a (1935), N. C. GEN. STAT.
§49-71 (Michie, et al., Supp. 1945) ; Ouxio GEN. CODE ANN. §12122-1, 2 (Page,
8upp. 1946); S. D. CODE §36.0602 (1939); Wis. STAT. §§166.105, 325.23
(Brossard, 1943).
States without such statutes are naturally loath to give a specially desig-
nated weight to blood test evidence. Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App.2d 652,
169 P.2d 444 (1946).
12. Saks v. Saks, 189 Misc. 667. 668, 71 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798 (N.Y. Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1947); 34 CORNELL L. Q. 72, 75 (1948).
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in 1900 by Nobel Prize winning Karl Landsteiner and is based
on the fact that there are two different substances found in red
blood corpuscles-"A" and "B", called isoagglutinable because
it is their clustering under artificial circumstances that enables
them to be classified. The blood corpuscles of a given individual
may contain "A", "B", both, or neither and thus be grouped
A, B, AB, or 0 respectively. The simplest rule of inherited blood
following from this is that a child may not have an isoagglutin-
able substance in his blood which is lacking in both his parents. 13
This rule also applies to another test based on isoagglutination
which types blood rather than groups it. The two factors "M"
and "N" exist singly or in combination in all blood regardless of
its group and a given factor cannot exist in the child when
absent from both parents' serological make-up nor can any type
M parent have a type N child and vice-versa. 14 The most recent
blood characteristic discovered is the rhesus factor giving rise
to the RH-hr test. As a result of the blood divisions created from
this theory of six allelic genes, definite exclusionary laws may be
formulated as in the other tests.15
In Jordan v. Mace the complainant, both children, and respon-
dent were all group "A", making exclusion impossible by the
"A-B" test. However, a blood typing disclosed one twin pos-
sessed only factor "'M", while respondent was limited to factor
"N"-serologically impossible if the jury verdict was correct.
Complainant ---------------------.A M
Child X --------------------------- A M
Child Y ----------------------.-.-...... .A MN
Respondent --------------.------------ A N
Except for twins, exclusion might have been impossible but
of course non-filiation of one twin must necessarily include the
other. The court does not settle this matter of multiple exclusion
but it would be a novel theory that created "half-twins." 16 The
13. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §165b (3d ed. 1940); Boyd, Protecting the
Evidentiary Value of Blood Group Determinations, 16 So. CALIF. L. REv.
193 (1943); WIENER, BLOOD GROUPS AND TRANSFUSIONS (3d ed. 1946).
14. WIENER, op. cit. supra note 13; Hooker and Boyd, Blood Grouping as
A Test of Non-Paternity, 25 J. CRIM. L. 187, 194 (1934).
Notice how the jury in Jordan v. Mace, 69 A.2d 670, 671 (Me. 1949)
found a serologically indicated type "N" respondent father of a type "M"
child. Similarly in Jordan v. Davis, 57 A.2d 209, 211 (Me. 1948). There is
no apparent kinship between the complainants Jordan.
15. Editorial, 125 J. AM. M. Ass'N. 495 (1944); 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. 156 REV.
(1948).
16. Jordan v. Mace, 69 A.2d 670, 671 (Me. 1949).
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RH-hr test was not used in the case, possibly because of its rela-
tive complexity or recent appearance. In any event, it was not
needed although it might have directly excluded respondent's
paternity of Child Y.
The statute authorizing the taking and forensic use of blood
tests in bastardy actions was passed in Maine in 1939. It pro-
vides for court ordered tests on motion of respondent, the
findings to be "admissible into evidence" where exclusion is
established.17 The statute is silent as to any specific weight to
be assigned such evidence. The intent of the 1939 state legis-
lature in regard to blood tests was probably quite in keeping
with the view of the court nine years later in Jordan v. Davis,
"The determination of such an issue [bastardy] is not trans-
ferred from the courtroom to the laboratory, where lurk certain
hazards in the application of scientific techniques."18 While there
is undoubtedly no question as to the conclusiveness of an accurate
test, science can never guarantee lack of human error. At least
this latter possibility has not been accorded legislative recogni-
tion by a statute giving, in certain terms, finality to the testimony
of serologists. However, there have unquestionably been tech-
nical advances in the administration of blood examinations in
the past decade. Jordan v. Mace has taken judicial notice of
these advances and as a result placed the burden on complainant
to show medical error.
The court's previous attitude toward blood as evidence is
indicated in Jordan v. Davis-almost identical in its facts with
the principal case, but resulting in a judgment against the
respondent-"father." The court refused to say that there was
no justification for a jury finding of technical inaccuracy al-
though the state of Maine "accepts this verdict of science °19 in
regard to the theory involved. The opinion goes on the tacit
assumption that the jury has repudiated not Landsteiner, but
the testifying serologist, Dr. Hooker (the same Dr. Hooker of
Jordan v. Mace fame). There may be some feeling that Jordan
v. Davis has been overruled by the instant case, and that the
17. ME. Rsv. STAT. c. 153, §34 (1944).
18. 57 A.2d 209, 210 (Me. 1948). A few lines later: "We do not believe
that the statute intended to make the result of a blood grouping test as
reported in court conclusive in the issue of non-paternity." [Italics sup-
plied.]
19. Jordan v. Davis, 54 A.2d 209, 210 (Me. 1948).
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Maine court has become the first of final impression to make
blood test evidence conclusive. This is not true. Actually we
have the logical next step from the earlier decision, requesting
"believable evidence ''2o that the tests were inaccurate and refus-
ing to subsume the reasons why the jury has not accepted the
"M-N" test results.
Of what probative force is blood evidence in Maine today?
There is no reason to think it has become conclusive to the extent
that a putative father is innocent as a matter of law upon testi-
mony of a serologist to that effect. This may be concluded to
be the present state of the law in Maine: where respondent has
been excluded serologically, the component parts of the evidence
of exclusion become the entire controversy. If, by credible
evidence, doubt is thrown on the skill of the examiners or the
validity of their conclusions, the serological indications of non-
paternity are rejoined by the other evidence and given only such
weight as the jury choose. The further significance of the case
awaits a determination as to what quantum of discrediting evi-
dence the Maine court will require to affirm a verdict of pater-
nity in the face of an apparently conflicting medical fact.
It is doubted whether this is the landmark decision for which
the medico-legal writers have called, i.e., upon testimony of
non-paternity by a blood expert with some sort of official certi-
fication, a directed verdict to that end.21 It is further doubted
whether such a decision soon will be forthcoming in Maine. A
procedure which would so greatly restrict the force of cross-
examination is properly viewed with caution.
DIXON F. SPIVY
PERSONAL PROPERTY-DEPOSIT OF FUNDS IN A BANK TO THE
JOINT CREDIT OF DECEASED DEPOSITOR AND SURVIVING DONEF,-
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AS APPLIED TO DEPOSIT OF FUNDS IN
NAME OF DEPOSITOR AND ANOTHER.-Crandall and defendant
Watts went to the plaintiff bank, signed, executed, and filed with
it an instrument wherein they agreed with each other and with
the bank that all deposits made therein by either of them should
20. Jordan v. Mace, 69 A.2d 670, 673 (Me. 1949). Three justices, it mightbe noted, were now sitting who were not present 15 months earlier forJordan v. Davis, note 19 supra.
21. Note, 1 MERcER L. REv 266, 278 (1950) Also see note 4 supra.
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